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Male-Female Supply to State
Government Jobs and
Comparable Worth
Peter F. Orazem, Iowa State University
J. Peter Mattila, Iowa State University
The proportion of women in state government jobs and applicant
pools is well explained by a model emphasizing supply-side factors.
Relative to men, women’s supply is least sensitive to wages in pre-
dominantly male jobs and most sensitive to wages in predominantly
female jobs. These results suggest that comparable worth policies
that shift relative pay toward traditionally female jobs and away from
traditionally male jobs will increase the proportion of females in
male-dominated, female-dominated, and total state government jobs.
The implication is that supply side responses need not prevent com-
parable worth pay adjustments from raising total female compen-
sation.
I. Introduction
After one-half century of nearly unchanging occupational segregation
by sex, women began moving into nontraditional jobs in the 1970s. How-
ever, despite evidence of declining differences in the occupational distri-
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butions of men and women, the U.S. labor market is still highly segre-
gated. Looking at occupations within establishments reveals even higher
degrees of job segregation (Bielby and Barron 1984). The persistence of
job segregation has come to dominate the discussion of policies to redress
disparate labor market outcomes concerning employed men and women.
Wage differences between men and women are smaller within narrowly
defined occupations than they are across occupations. Both men and
women in predominantly female occupations have lower average pay than
men and women in predominantly male occupations. As a result, much
of the wage differential between men and women is tied to the different
employers and occupational labor markets that men and women inhabit
and not to disparate treatment within given employers. Blau (1977) finds
that men and women are employed in different firms even within an
occupation. Groshen (1991) reported that one-half to two-thirds of the
pay gap between the sexes in manufacturing and service jobs could be
attributed to differences in occupational status. This has led to allegations
of market pay discrimination against predominantly female jobs in addi-
tion to allegations of access barriers.
Based on this presumption, some have proposed government interven-
tion in the setting of relative pay between male and female jobs. These
comparable worth policies have been relegated to the public sector in the
United States, but they have been extended (in various guises) to the
private sector in other countries, most notably in Australia and the Prov-
ince of Ontario in Canada. Underlying comparable worth is the notion
that as women’s labor supply has increased, they have been crowded into
the relatively few sectors in which they can compete for jobs. Thus,
occupational barriers imposed by discriminating firms have resulted in
both occupational segregation and artificially lower pay for female jobs.1
The presumption of comparable worth is that, at least in the short run,
occupational supply behavior of women and men do not respond to
changes in relative wages. Without any supply response, these pay policies
can raise female compensation in traditionally female jobs and, thus, raise
the overall pay of women relative to men.
Other studies have emphasized supply-side explanations for occupa-
tional segregation. Some studies have pointed to differences in expected
career length or to intermittent employment spells as explaining differ-
ences in incentives for men and women to select occupations. If there are
different costs associated with time spent out of the labor force ( loss of
wage growth or lost skills) , women may opt for occupations with low
1 England (1982) , Beller (1982) , and Bergman (1989) present arguments and
evidence supporting the view that occupational segregation is a result of firm
discrimination.
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exit costs.2 Other supply-side explanations of the difference in occupa-
tional status by sex have centered on presumed difference in tastes for
nonpecuniary job attributes between the sexes (Filer 1983) .
If the relative number of men and women in an occupation does vary
with supply-side behavior, comparable worth policies aimed at raising
compensation to women in traditionally female jobs may have some unex-
pected consequences. Although there are not comparable estimates for
females, there is considerable evidence that male occupational supply
elasticities are large.3 If men are more sensitive than women to occupa-
tional wage changes, then men will have an incentive to enter traditionally
female jobs if pay for those jobs is increased. Similarly, if pay for tradition-
ally male jobs falls due to these policies, men will move out of these jobs
in greater proportions, increasing the proportion of women in tradition-
ally male jobs. Even if women have perfectly inelastic occupational supply
curves, elastic male occupational supply curves would suggest that the
sex composition of jobs is not invariant to relative wages. Yet studies of
the effect of comparable worth on male and female pay implicitly have
assumed that the current distribution of men and women across occupa-
tions is invariant to changes in relative wages.4
This study estimates relative male and female wage elasticities to state
government jobs using two data sets. One sample includes information
on employees in states that have implemented comparable worth pay
plans, states using other factor point plans to set pay, and states that have
pay systems that are not set by factor points.5 In addition, we study data
on applicants to Iowa state government jobs. We estimate how the relative
2 Polachek (1981) and McDowell (1982) present evidence that there are differ-
ent costs of interrupted work careers between traditionally male and traditionally
female careers. Sandell and Shapiro (1980) found that anticipated labor force
attachment affected earnings growth for young women.
3 Freeman (1987a ) and Orazem and Mattila (1991) provide estimates of male
occupational supply elasticities that are highly elastic. Comparable supply elastici-
ties for women have not been published to date.
4 Sorenson (1990) reviews a large number of studies that measure how the
proportion female in an occupation alters occupational pay. The presumption is
that raising pay to predominantly female occupations would then reduce pay
differences between men and women overall. The potential for men to enter
traditionally female jobs is not factored into these projections.
5 A factor point system evaluates the relative value of each job within a pay
system by assigning points to each job. These points are based on the levels of
skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions associated with each job. The
summed points generate a hierarchy of jobs that are then mapped into relative
pay, usually with some adjustments to take into account market pay. Comparable
worth plans differ from traditional factor point plans in that market wages are
explicitly excluded from the setting of relative pay.
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number of female incumbents or applicants responds to changes in market
and state government occupational pay.
The concentration on state government labor markets offers many ad-
vantages. The most obvious is that state governments have been the focus
of most of the effort to implement comparable worth policies. A second
advantage is that relative pay across occupations within each state govern-
ment tends to be fixed across time by the pay plan and does not (necessar-
ily) respond to changing market supply factors (Kim 1989). This implies
that relative government wages tend to be exogenous within each state.
In the next section, we provide a theory of occupational supply of men
and women to the public sector. This motivates the empirical strategy
outlined in Section III. Section IV summarizes the nature of our two data
sets and the estimates of our model, along with implications and discus-
sion of alternative demand-side interpretations. Section V briefly states
our major conclusions.
II. Theory
We decompose the choice of whether or not to select a public-sector
job into two parts. First, an individual selects an occupation. All employ-
ers may participate in this occupational market, but each employer is too
small to affect market wages for the occupation. Once an individual selects
an occupation in stage 1, the individual opts for either a public- or private-
sector job in stage 2. Our empirical work will concentrate on the stage
2 decision, but we will first describe the two stages separately.
A. Stage 1: Occupational Choice
The human capital investment theory of occupational choice presumes
that an individual selects an occupation so as to maximize expected utility.
Utility depends on the earnings in the occupation and the nonpecuniary
returns associated with job-specific amenities or disamenities. Because
individuals differ in talents and in tastes, not all individuals will rank
occupations similarly in terms of expected utility. As a result, an individ-
ual j will select occupation i among N alternatives so as to maximize
expected utility Ueij . The form for expected utility is assumed to be
Ueij  Uij(Wij , Zij) , (1)
where Wij is individual j ’s wage in occupation i and Zij is a vector of
occupational amenities and disamenities associated with occupation i .
Due to differences in abilities and locations, the Wij and Zij will vary
across individuals. Individual valuation of those wages and amenities will
also differ. Consequently, individuals will rank occupations differently.
The variation across individuals in expected utility across N occupa-
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tions will generate a distribution of I individuals across N occupations
such that
I  ∑
N
i1
Li , (2)
where Li is the number of agents supplying labor to occupation i .
Differences in Ueij , Wij , and Zij across the sexes will cause the proportion
of men and women to differ across occupations. Males and females may
differ in expected earnings or amenities in an occupation, and they may
have different relative valuations of these occupational attributes.
Let Mi be the number of men and Fi be the number of women in
occupation i . Women’s share of occupation i , SFi , is
SFi  Fi /Li  S (Wi , Zi ) , (3)
where total labor supply to occupation i is Li  Mi / Fi . The factors
that differ across males and females within an occupation would also be
expected to differ across spatially distinct labor markets. As a result, SFi
is likely to differ across markets.
B. Stage 2: Public- versus Private-Sector Choice
By their nature as multiproduct producers, state governments employ
workers from many different occupational labor markets. Governments
must compete for workers against other firms in the occupational labor
market. Therefore, compensation for public employees must be such that
expected utility from work in the government must equal or exceed that
offered by other firms in the same occupational market for enough work-
ers to fill public jobs.
If government jobs were identical in all respects to private-sector jobs,
then the occupational distribution of public-sector men and women
would be identical to that in the private sector. However, considerable
evidence supports the presumption that public- and private-sector jobs
are not identical in pecuniary and nonpecuniary attributes. On average,
public-sector employees receive higher pay than similarly skilled private-
sector workers. The pay gap is largest at the federal level, with more
moderate pay advantages for state and local workers (Smith 1977; Free-
man 1987b ) . These favorable wage gaps are largest for female public-
sector workers (Krueger 1988) . In addition, employee benefits and job
security appear to be more generous in the public sector (Quinn 1982;
Freeman 1987b ) . While these nonwage attributes will be very similar for
men and women within a given state government pay system, men and
women may differ in their tastes for these nonpecuniary job attributes
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(Blank 1985). As a result of these gender differences in government pay
versus market pay and potential differences in tastes for government job
attributes, the relative supply of female and male applicants to a govern-
ment job may deviate from relative supply to the occupation as a whole.
Given the proportion of women in the occupation, SFi , the relative
incentive to select public-sector employment depends on public-sector
wages, wi , and public-sector amenities, zi . The proportion of women in
government occupation i can be characterized by
s fi 
fi
mi / fi  s (S
F
i , wi , zi ) . (4)
The overall proportion female S fi should be positively related to s
f
i
since one would expect a larger proportion in the applicant pool and
because of gender differences in job-specific skills. If the public sector is
small relative to the total occupational labor market, SFi can be treated as
exogenous to s fi . However, if the proportion of women in the occupation
is altered by public-sector wages and job attributes, then the exogeneity
assumption is suspect. In that case, equation (3) can be used to predict
SFi so that
s fi  s (SO Fi , wi , zi ) , (5)
or in reduced form,
s fi  s (Wi , Zi , wi , zi ) . (6)
Our main interest is in establishing how the proportion of females in
a public-sector job is affected by public-sector wages. The effect of wages
on the proportion of females in public employment is not obvious because
men and women may differ in their relative sensitivity to government
wages. In equations (4) – (6) , the derivative of s fi with respect to wi is
ds fi /dwi  [ (mi / fi ) (dfi /dwi ) 0 fi ( (dmi /dwi )
/ (dfi /dwi ) ) ]/(mi / fi ) 2 ,
where mi and fi are the number of men and women in government
occupation i . Combining terms, we obtain
ds fi /dwi  [mi (dfi /dwi ) 0 fi (dmi /dwi ) ]/(mi / fi ) 2 . (7)
The relation in (7) can be converted to elasticity form by multiplying
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and dividing the right-hand side by mi , fi , and wi . The equation is then
written as
ds fi /dwi  (e fi 0 emi ) ( s fi smi )/wi , (8)
where e ji is the wage elasticity of supply to government occupation i for
sex j , and s ji is the proportion of occupation i incumbents who are of sex
j . Because an increase in wi must increase expected utility from choosing
job i , e ji must be positive for j  m , f . Provided that there is at least one
male and at least one female incumbent, ( s fi s
m
i )/wi is positive. Therefore,
the effect of an increase in government wages on female employment in
an occupation will depend on the relative size of the female and male
public-sector labor supply elasticities in the occupation. If, for example,
women are more sensitive to increases in public-sector wages, then e fi emi and ds fi /dwi  0. But if the male and female supply elasticities
are identical, (e fi  emi ) , then (8) implies that the coefficient on the
public-sector wage will be zero.
The theory suggests that one can determine the relative size of male and
female wage elasticities to government employment by estimating a regres-
sion equation approximating equations (4) – (6). The most obvious problem
with this strategy is that the number of incumbents in a job is a function of
both labor demand and labor supply. Therefore, the wage elasticity will
reflect both demand and supply effects. However, the concentration on the
proportion female in the job rather than the total number of incumbents as
the dependent variable makes it possible to sidestep some of these problems.
Let li  fi / mi be the total number of public-sector positions in job i ,
where mi is the number of male incumbents and fi is the number of female
incumbents. Government labor demand decisions will set the number of
positions (li ). If governments do not discriminate by sex in hiring, the
proportion of female incumbents to the total will reflect the proportion of
female incumbents in the qualified application pool. In this way, s fi  fi /li
will reflect the relative incentives of males and females to supply labor to
government. In contrast, if governments systematically discriminate against
women, the proportion of women in government jobs will reflect demand-
side tastes for discrimination as well as relative supply-side reactions to
wages. We will examine the demand- versus supply-side explanations in the
empirical section.
III. Empirical Strategy
Equations (4) – (6) suggest that one can derive an estimate of the rela-
tive size of male and female occupational supply elasticities by estimating
regressions of the form
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s fi  a0 / a1SFi / a2wi / a3zi / eAi , (9a)
s fi  b0 / b1SO Fi / b2wi / b3zi / eBi , (9b)
and
s fi  g0 / g1wWi / g1zZi / g2wi / g3zi / eci , (9c)
where ei is an error term and the other variables are defined above.
In (9a) , the proportion of female incumbents in the market as a whole
is assumed to be exogenous to the proportion of female incumbents in
state government. If this assumption is invalid, the instrumental SO Fi or its
reduced form is preferred. As will be shown, the qualitative results for
the coefficient on wi are not sensitive to the specification choice.
Equations (9a) – (9c) presume that the starting pay for each job is
predetermined. This assumption is quite reasonable, especially when pay
is measured in relative terms. Government pay structures tend to be rigid:
pay increases are generally implemented across the board. A study of the
California merit pay system by Kim (1989) found that relative pay in
the 1980s could be predicted with near certainty by relative pay in the
1930s. This institutional rigidity implies that starting wages in the merit
system are not altered in response to changes in the sex composition of
incumbents in the job. It is, of course, possible that these relative wages
were sex-biased when set years ago, but for our purposes, it is only
important that they be viewed as predetermined data by workers.
An exception to this argument lies in the implementation of comparable
worth pay plans. Since comparable worth states base pay at least partly
on proportional female incumbency and because of their recent imple-
mentation, predetermination of state relative pay using 1987–88 data may
be questionable. Fortunately, we also have information from states that
have not implemented comparable worth systems. We test the govern-
ment pay exogeneity assumption by examining the sensitivity of the pa-
rameter estimates when only noncomparable worth states are included.
Their pay systems have been in place longer and have no explicit goal to
link pay to the proportion of female incumbents.
A second way to remove possible simultaneity between s fi and wi is
to use the proportion of female applicants for job vacancies rather than
the proportion of female employees as the dependent variable. Because
pay is set before jobs are advertised, applicants must be responding to
public-sector wages. As we show below, results using a sample of appli-
cants were similar (although not identical) to those using the sample of
incumbents.
IV. Data and Results
A. Multistate Analysis
In this section we investigate data on incumbents gathered from a
survey of state government personnel departments. After obtaining a
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complete listing of job titles from a subset of states, we selected 78 job
titles that were common to most states, that matched published 1980
Census of Population occupation titles (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1983,
table 222) , and that spanned the range of traditionally male, traditionally
female, and mixed jobs such as carpenter, clerk, and registered nurse. The
list of jobs by gender composition is included in the appendix. Phone
interviews with state personnel professionals indicated that these jobs
were also broadly representative of the range of jobs performed in state
government. State personnel managers were asked to match the job title
to the closest position in their state pay system. Respondents were asked
to call for clarifications if they were uncertain about the job title, and
titles that were not easily recognized were dropped. For each job, the
personnel professional was asked to report the starting pay, the propor-
tion female, and whether the job was covered by a union contract. In
addition, information was obtained on whether the state’s pay system
was a comparable worth pay system, a factor point pay system, or some
other pay system.
Sixteen states declined to participate or did not have consistent state-
wide pay systems. Another 14 had information on pay and union status
but did not have information on female incumbents by job classification.
The remaining 20 states supplied the necessary information. These states
are listed in table 1 along with information on their pay system and
public-sector unionization. Pooling across the 20 states, we had complete
information on 1,393 state jobs, an average of almost 70 job titles per
state pay system. The information provided was from state pay systems
in 1987 or 1988.
Seven of the 20 state systems are not covered by collective-bargaining
agreements, but workers in states with comparable worth systems are
more likely to be covered by a collective bargaining agreement. The infor-
mation in table 1 also shows that in 16 of the 20 states, the proportion
of women incumbents in state government is higher than their relative
proportion in the state labor market as a whole. Several states, including
Connecticut, Delaware, Nevada, North Carolina, and Virginia, have
much higher levels of female state government incumbency than in the
same occupations in the state as a whole.6
6 Our state occupation data are taken from 1980 census figures (U.S. Bureau
of the Census 1983) . Despite the 8-year gap between the census data and our
survey data, our results are quite consistent with national data for 1988. Averaging
across all jobs in our multistate sample, women represented an average of 50.5%
of state incumbents as opposed to 45.7% of employees in the related occupation
in the state. These numbers are comparable to 1988 annual averages as reported
in the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (1989) Employment and Earnings. Women
represented 49.1% of all public employees and 45.7% of employees in private
establishments.
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Table 1
Characteristics of State Pay Systems: Multistate Sample of Incumbents
Job Titles Union s f S f
Comparable worth states:
Connecticut 67 .94 .54 .45
Iowa 77 .70 .49 .48
Michigan 57 .90 .54 .47
Minnesota 75 .89 .50 .47
Oregon 72 .96 .51 .49
Washington 78 .00 .40 .47
Wisconsin 75 .88 .45 .46
Other factor point states:
Delaware 64 .53 .55 .46
Maine 67 .97 .47 .42
New Hampshire 76 .94 .55 .47
Oklahoma 78 .00 .45 .48
Vermont 69 1.00 .50 .53
Wyoming 67 .00 .56 .47
Nonfactor-point states:
Alaska 63 .98 .46 .44
Colorado 69 .00 .51 .44
Montana 65 1.00 .55 .48
Nebraska 72 1.00 .46 .45
Nevada 61 .00 .49 .38
North Carolina 71 .00 .56 .43
Virginia 74 .00 .58 .46
NOTE.—Union, s f, and Sf are unweighted averages across job titles within each state. The Union
column reports the proportion of job titles covered by collective bargaining in the state pay system;
figures in the Union and s f columns are based on information provided by a survey of state government
personnel specialists; figures in the Sf column were computed from 1980 U.S. census state-level data on
all men and women in the detailed occupations that most closely resemble the state government job
titles. Some of the comparable worth states such as Michigan have made some comparable worth pay
adjustments without instituting a complete study or adjustment. Washington implemented a comparable
worth plan only after a legal suit was dropped as a result of union negotiations.
The measures of proportion female and union coverage are self-explan-
atory. The measure of state occupation pay (w ) requires further comment.
Differences in cost-of-living, benefits, job conditions, local amenities, or
other factors may alter the relative attractiveness of state government jobs
across states. To control for variation in these unmeasured compensating
differentials, we normalize pay in state job i relative to an ‘‘average’’ pay
rate computed for each state. There were eight occupations that were
common to all states for which we had pay information.7 An average
base was computed across these eight occupations by state using
wij  ( (1/8) ∑
8
i1
wij)01wij , (10)
7 These eight occupations included computer operator, cook, laundry worker,
librarian, library assistant, licensed practical nurse, occupational therapist, and
social worker.
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This measure, together with a set of state dummy variables, removes the
biases associated with interstate compensating differentials.
The use of publicly known, institutional pay plans with clear entry
wage rates implies that males and females will receive the same wage rate.
Nondiscrimination policies and public scrutiny assured this within the
public sector in the late 1980s. As Blau (1977) and Groshen (1991) imply,
private-sector wages may differ by gender within an occupation because
of gender segregation and wage differentials between firms. In an attempt
to control for this, we compute the ratio of female-to-male earnings
within the state (W F/W M ) , which becomes an additional control variable.
Table 2 contains definitions and sample statistics of the variables used
in the analysis of the 20-state incumbent data set. The sample statistics
are reported for all jobs and for predominantly male and predominantly
female jobs. Male jobs were defined (following much of the literature)
as jobs in which, when averaged across all 20 state governments, more
than 75% of all incumbents were male. These represent about 30% of all
jobs in the sample. Similarly, female jobs were defined as jobs in which
more than 75% of the incumbents are female. Twenty-six percent of
jobs in the sample were predominantly female, leaving 44% of the jobs
implicitly defined as mixed. The average male-dominated job was 90%
male, and the average female-dominated job was 88% female.
The measure of relative female status in each occupation in the state
as a whole comes from the 1980 Census of Population data on year-round
full-time workers in detailed occupations. The measure is based on the
number of men and women in the state whose occupation most closely
matches the job title in the state government. The 1980 census was used
to reduce the likelihood that Sij and sij were simultaneously determined.
A comparison of the proportion female in state government jobs and
the proportion female in the state reveals considerable consistency. Just
over half of the state government employees in these occupations are
female, whereas 46% of the workers in these occupations in the state as
a whole are women. In both traditionally male and traditionally female
occupations, the proportion female in state government jobs is about 2%
higher than the proportion female in the state as a whole.
As discussed above, SFi , the proportion of women in the occupation
as a whole may be endogenous if the public sector hires a large proportion
of the relevant occupational supply. Following equation (3) , a vector of
instruments is used for SFi . One of the variables is (W F/W M ) , the annual
income of full-time women relative to full-time men in the occupation
as a whole. The other instruments are measures of overall occupational
attributes, Zi , including average occupational pay, W, required previous
job experience, required ability in reading, mathematics and logic, re-
quired strength, and estimates of hourly benefits in the occupation. The
required experience, ability, and strength measures come from the Dic-
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Table 2
Sample Statistics and Definitions of Variables:
Multistate Sample of Incumbents
All Jobs Male Jobs Female Jobs
Dependent variable:
s f: proportion female in government job .505 .101 .888
(.37) (.16) (.16)
Government job variables:
w: wage in government job (normalized)* 1.103 1.228 .930
(.36) (.48) (.20)
Male Job: dummy variable indicating 75%
male incumbents .296 . . . . . .
(.47)
Female Job: dummy variable indicating 75%
female incumbents .261 . . . . . .
(.44)
Union: proportion of workers in government job
covered by collective bargaining .577 .594 .567
(.49) (.49) (.49)
Market variables:
SF: proportion female in reference occupation .457 .080 .865
(.34) (.09) (.143)
W: earnings in reference occupation
(normalized)* 1.383 1.723 1.006
(.64) (.91) (.218)
WF/WM: relative female to male earnings .722 .679 .772
(.18) (.21) (.19)
Required Experience (months) 30.32 34.79 18.22
(27.0) (28.5) (19.3)
Required Reading 4.09 4.01 3.72
(1.06) (1.20) (.78)
Required Mathematics 3.14 3.05 2.71
(1.25) (1.33) (.72)
Required Logic 3.68 3.25 3.59
(1.25) (1.39) (.91)
Required Strength 2.15 2.80 1.79
(.89) (.89) (.76)
Benefits 1.45 1.43 1.22
(.50) (.53) (.42)
NOTE.—Unweighted averages across all states and jobs with standard deviations in parentheses. The
dependent variable and the government job variables are from the Survey of state government personnel
specialists. The market variables Sf, W, and WF/WM are from the 1980 U.S. census state-level data on
detailed occupations. The ‘‘Required’’ variables are from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (U.S.
Department of Labor 1977), and the ‘‘Benefits’’ variable is from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(various issues).
* This is normalized relative to the ‘‘average’’ state wage defined in eq. (10).
tionary of Occupational Titles (U.S. Department of Labor 1977) , while
the benefits data are compiled from ‘‘Employer Costs for Employee
Compensation—March’’ (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, various issues)
for broad occupational groups. Predominantly male jobs disproportion-
ately require experience and strength. On average, predominantly female
jobs require less reading and mathematics skills but more logic skills than
predominantly male jobs. Female jobs have lower benefits than the aver-
age across all jobs.
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The generalized least squares estimates of equations (9a) – (9c) , ex-
plaining the proportion of female state government incumbents by de-
tailed occupation in the 20 states, are reported in tables 3 and 4.8 All
regressions include the unionization variable and state dummy variables
as elements of the vector zi .
We interact government starting pay (w ) with dummy variables for
male- and female-dominated jobs. This allows inferences to be drawn on
how wage policies aimed at raising relative pay for female-dominated
jobs will affect the sex composition of state jobs. The coefficient on
(uninteracted) wi represents the response of the proportion of women
incumbents to changes in wages in mixed gender jobs. These coefficients
are always positive, indicating that women are more sensitive to state
government pay in mixed-gender jobs than are men. All of the coefficients
on government wages interacted with the female-dominated job dummy
variable are positive and significant. The implication is that women’s labor
supply to predominantly female jobs is relatively more elastic than their
supply to mixed jobs. The total effect (determined by adding the coeffi-
cients on w and w∗Female Job) is positive as well. The reverse is true
for predominantly male state jobs. The sum of coefficients on w and
w∗Male Job are negative, indicating that men have higher elasticities of
supply to predominantly male jobs than do women.
These results suggest that a policy to raise relative pay for predomi-
nantly female public jobs would raise the proportion of women in female
dominated and mixed jobs. If, as is likely, such increases for predomi-
nantly female jobs come at the expense of raises in traditionally male
jobs, then relative wages in the latter jobs will drop. Because women
have lower supply elasticities in male-dominated jobs, the proportion of
women in traditionally male jobs will also increase as relatively more
males exit these jobs. Therefore, these results suggest that a comparable
worth pay policy would tend to raise the proportion of women employed
in both female-dominated and male-dominated state government jobs.
Because hiring policies in government are typically based on formal
tests and civil service procedures across all occupations, we minimize the
likelihood that our results are due to discriminatory hiring policies.
Equally important, government hiring in the 1980s was subject to much
public scrutiny and political pressure to avoid discrimination. If the public
sector has been less discriminatory than private-sector firms in recent
8 Because of the potential massing of observations on the dependent variable
at zero and at one, we also estimated these equations (and those in table 7) using
a Tobit specification with upper and lower bounds. None of the findings changed.
Examination of the error terms indicated that the least squares specification was
less subject to heteroskedastic errors than was the Tobit specification. Standard
errors were corrected for heteroskedasticity, using White’s (1980) method.
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Table 3
Regression Analysis of Female State Government Occupational Shares
in 20 States
Equation
(9a) (9b) (9c)
w .093** .143** .111**
(3.21) (4.50) (2.36)
w∗Female Job .167** .309** .355**
(6.36) (17.2) (16.6)
w∗Male Job 0.187** 0.292** 0.291**
(9.23) (14.2) (14.6)
Union .011 .066 .087*
(.27) (1.48) (1.90)
Market variables:
SF .502**
(12.2)
SˆF .278**
(9.21)
W .034
(1.49)
WF/WM .015
(.37)
Required Experience 0.001
(1.28)
Required Reading 0.074**
(2.86)
Required Mathematics .035**
(2.90)
Required Logic .027
(1.34)
Required Strength 0.070**
(6.38)
Benefits 0.031
(1.38)
R2 .65 .61 .61
N 1,392 1,392 1,392
NOTE.—All regressions include 19 dummy variables for each state and an intercept. t-statistics cor-
rected for heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm
of SF.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
years, it is less likely that our results are attributable to employer hiring
discrimination.
However, if some state employers have tastes for discrimination for or
against women, the estimates in table 3 will reflect demand as well as
supply-side decisions. Given voluntary enactment, comparable worth
states would be least likely to have tastes for discrimination against
women and might even discriminate against men. This is especially true
since our data set was collected after comparable worth had been imple-
mented in these states. Conversely, the noncomparable worth states
would be more likely to have discriminatory tastes against women. To
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Table 4
Regression Analysis of Female State Government Occupational Shares by State Pay System
Equations
Comparable Worth States Other Factor Point States Not Factor Point States
(9a) (9b) (9c) (9a) (9b) (9c) (9a) (9b) (9c)
w .054 .138** .109 .116** .170** .020 .108** .134** .206**
(1.24) (3.20) (1.54) (2.25) (2.61) (.23) (3.29) (3.17) (3.01)
w∗Female Job .126** .339** .380** .177** .275** .336** .183** .308** .345**
(3.98) (7.97) (13.8) (4.16) (12.7) (9.97) (5.18) (11.6) (13.0)
w∗Male Job 0.125** 0.275** 0.284** 0.202** 0.282** 0.256** 0.222** 0.319** 0.329**
(5.58) (9.60) (10.5) (5.72) (12.8) (8.02) (8.66) (13.6) (12.8)
Union .007 .072 .085** 0.036 .040* .090 .386** .513** .503**
(.23) (.52) (2.17) (.49) (1.82) (1.25) (7.57) (11.3) (8.63)
Market variables:
SF .592** .418** .526**
(12.5) (6.56) (8.62)
SˆF .223** .322** .294**
(6.95) (5.28) (6.96)
W .026 .070 0.013
(.84) (1.66) (.44)
WF/WM .009 .007 .009
(.10) (.12) (.19)
Required Experience 0.0006 0.0015* .0000
(.95) (1.76) (.04)
Required Reading 0.020 0.095** 0.103**
(.62) (2.35) (2.73)
Required Mathematics .007 .064** .033*
(.45) (3.24) (1.83)
Required Strength 0.046** 0.098** 0.072**
(3.32) (6.07) (4.84)
Benefits 0.011 0.006 0.077**
(.41) (.18) (2.56)
R2 .73 .64 .64 .57 .55 .58 .67 .63 .63
N 501 501 501 416 416 416 475 475 475
NOTE.—All regressions include 19 dummy variables for each state and an intercept. t-statistics corrected for heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
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Table 5
Differences in Supply Elasticities between Men and Women and Simulated
Response to Comparable Worth Wage Adjustments
A. Elasticities
Mixed Jobs Female Jobs Male Jobs
1. All states .63 4.24 02.01
2. Comparable worth states .61 3.97 01.85
3. Other factor point states .74 3.73 01.24
4. Not factor point states .60 5.72 03.06
5. Iowa sample of applicants to state
government jobs 0.69 .30 02.74
B. Response to 11% Increase in Pay or Predominantly Female Jobs
% Change in Proportion Female
Mixed Jobs Female Jobs Male Jobs Total
6. All states 01.13 3.06 10.1 3.25
7. Comparable worth states 01.13 3.34 9.54 3.17
8. Other factor point states 01.15 3.08 5.13 1.68
9. Not factor point states 01.16 2.84 2.26 .65
10. Iowa sample of applicants to
state government jobs 1.43 .10 9.37 3.42
NOTE.—All estimates are based on the two-stage parameter estimates in tables 3, 4, and 6. In pt. B,
the 11% increase in relative pay for predominantly female jobs assumes a 6.4% increase in female jobs
and a 4.2% decrease in other jobs, leaving average government wages unchanged.
examine these hypotheses, equations (9a) – (9c) were estimated separately
for comparable worth states, factor point states, and non-factor-point
states. Non-comparable-worth states were dichotomized into the two
latter groups given the possibility that nonfactor point states might have
more flexibility to discriminate. The results, reported in table 4, are re-
markably consistent across subsamples. If these results are due to demand-
side tastes for discrimination, then these tastes are so pervasive as to be
similar in the most proactive and traditional states.
To make these results easier to examine, implied differences in public-
sector wage elasticities across the sexes are reported in table 5, evaluated
at sample means. Because the results are similar across specifications, we
report only those using coefficients from estimates of (9b) . The computa-
tion is performed by transforming equation (8) so that
(e fi 0 emi )  (ds fi /dwi ) (wi / s fi smi ) , (11)
where the derivative is the appropriate coefficient from tables 3 and 4.
The difference in elasticities reported in table 5 tell a consistent story
across all pay plans. Women are more sensitive to changes in public-
sector pay for mixed and female dominated jobs. The gap between wage
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elasticities is largest in the female-dominated jobs. In contrast, men have
much higher wage elasticities in traditionally male jobs. The differences
between male and female wage elasticities are larger in states using pay
plans that are not based on factor points, perhaps indicating demand-side
tastes that reinforce supply-side differences.
If the relative elasticities in table 5 are to be explained by discriminatory
selective hiring by sex, then it must be that state governments give prefer-
ential treatment to hiring males as occupational entry-level wages rise in
predominantly male jobs. At the same time, state governments would
have to give preferential treatment to hiring females as the occupational
entry-level wage rises in mixed and female dominated jobs. Since none
of the positions are supervisory, and all are entry-level positions filled
from outside hires, the pattern cannot be explained by preferential promo-
tions within the state job hierarchy. While it is possible that states engage
systematically in selective preferential hiring policies that vary by entry-
level wage and gender composition of the job, the supply-side story seems
more plausible. That is, although employers may prefer males as the wage
rises in male dominated jobs, it seems unlikely that they would also prefer
females as the wage rises in mixed and female-dominated jobs.
B. Iowa Applications Analysis
To better distinguish supply decisions from demand decisions, it is
preferable to use measures of notional supply to state governments, rather
than measures of incumbents already employed. Such data were available
for 148 jobs in the Iowa state government for the years 1986 ( 12 year) ,
1987–88, 1989–90, and 1990–91. Only entry-level occupations were se-
lected to avoid problems associated with applications to jobs for which
prior state experience was a prerequisite.
The Iowa applications data includes only those deemed qualified for
the job. Qualifications are determined by education, past experience, li-
censure, or performance on exams as dictated by the particular require-
ments of each job. Applications are only taken when openings exist. For
some jobs, with many incumbents and high turnover, applications are
taken continuously throughout the year. For other jobs, applications may
only be taken for a month or two. Therefore, the use of relative numbers
of applicants by gender, rather than the absolute number of applicants,
immediately controls for the length of time that applications were being
accepted. Both males and females have equal opportunity to apply, and
the relative number of women in each applicant pool represents the rela-
tive supply of women to state government.
The regressors include those used in the multistate analysis of incum-
bents plus a few other variables that were thought to affect the marginal
utility of accepting state employment. The state government wage is mea-
sured as the starting wage in the job as taken from state pay plans for
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the relevant years. The market wage was computed as the average wage
from the March Current Population Survey (CPS) tapes (U.S. Bureau of
the Census, various years) of the occupation most closely tied to the state
occupation for the 3 years preceding the application year. The applications
data better matched the more detailed CPS occupational titles as opposed
to the more broadly defined published census tables used for the
multistate sample. The comparison was made by using the Iowa Depart-
ment of Personnel’s (1986) ‘‘Minimum Qualifications Guide’’ to identify
occupations or skills deemed qualifying for entry into the state job. Re-
gional wages were used for jobs in which local markets were presumed
to be most relevant. National averages were used for jobs that are primar-
ily highly skilled and for which national recruitment was presumed to
occur. The CPS tapes also provided information on the relative number
of women and men in the occupation.9
These variables were supplemented by several other measures of the
attractiveness of the job. The first is the number of openings in the job
during the year. This was derived from the December payroll tapes as
the number of incumbents in each job with less than 1 year of experience
with the state. The potential for advancement was measured by the num-
ber of pay grades one could advance from the entry job before becoming
a supervisor. This was constructed using the Iowa ‘‘Minimum Qualifica-
tions Guide,’’ which provided information on jobs for which experience
in the entry job would be considered qualifying for internal promotion.
That source also provided information on the educational and experience
requirements of the job.
The sample statistics for these variables are reported in table 6. Male-
and female-dominated jobs were again defined to be those with more
than 75% incumbents of that sex. The first finding from table 6 is that
applicants do not match the current sex composition of the job. While
women make up 7% of the incumbents (as computed from Iowa payroll
tapes) in the male jobs, they make up over 20% of the qualified applicants
to those jobs. Similarly, men make up 23% of the qualified applicants to
female jobs, whereas current incumbents are only 7% male. This would
suggest the potential for large changes in the sex composition of these
jobs in the future. It also suggests that historical labor supply decisions
(as reflected by those already employed) may differ from labor supply
decisions made by current job entrants.
9 The job titles in the Iowa applications data set did not all match census
occupations. The CPS tapes have more narrowly defined occupations than do
the published detailed census data, but the CPS has much smaller sample sizes.
Pooling over 3 years of March Current Population Survey data was necessary to
insure large enough samples to estimate average market wages for narrowly de-
fined occupations.
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Table 6
Sample Statistics and Definitions of Variables:
Iowa State Applications Sample
All Jobs Male Jobs Female Jobs
Dependent variable:
s f: proportion female applicants for
state jobs .506 .201 .770
(.30) (.20) (.21)
Government job variables:
w: starting biweekly wage/100 for
government job 7.26 7.89 6.64
(1.52) (1.54) (1.42)
Union: dummy variable indicating if
the state job is covered by union
contract .677 .630 .635
(.47) (.48) (.48)
Male Job: dummy variable
indicating 75% male
incumbents .302 . . . . . .
(.46)
Female Job: dummy variable
indicating 75% female
incumbents .326 . . . . . .
(.47)
Openings: number of vacancies to
be filled 33.4 13.3 50.0
(105.0) (28.4) (121.8)
Pay Growth: potential pay grade
growth in occupational job ladder 3.51 2.78 3.85
(3.14) (3.20) (3.22)
Required (Iowa) Education (years) 13.9 13.7 13.5
(2.61) (2.87) (1.86)
Required (Iowa) Experience (years) 1.34 1.69 1.45
(1.47) (1.51) (1.48)
Market variables:
W: 3-year average biweekly wage/
100 for reference occupation 8.41 9.30 7.07
(3.01) (2.88) (2.38)
SF: Proportion female in reference
occupation .531 .266 .776
(.31) (.24) (.21)
WF/WM .697 .685 .703
(.12) (.10) (.13)
Required Experience (months) 35.13 44.81 26.78
(27.08) (29.46) (23.69)
Required Reading 4.41 4.36 4.22
(.83) (.80) (.85)
Required Mathematics 3.47 3.62 3.18
(1.08) (1.19) (.88)
Required Logic 3.91 3.96 3.64
(1.03) (1.03) (.98)
Required Strength 1.82 2.20 1.66
(.80) (.85) (.73)
Benefits 1.56 1.60 1.44
(.47) (.46) (.44)
NOTE.—These are unweighted averages across all detailed jobs within Iowa with standard deviations
in parentheses. Variables W and w are deflated by the implicit price deflator for consumer goods,
1987  100. The market variables W, SF, and WF/WM are the CPS occupations deemed to provide the
best background to meet the requirements of state job i, as defined in the ‘‘Minimum Qualifications Guide’’
(Iowa Department of Personnel 1986). The ‘‘Required’’ variables are from the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles (U.S. Department of Labor 1977), and the Benefits variable is from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(various issues).
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The sample statistics for the Iowa job attributes are reported in table
6. Starting wages in predominantly female-dominated jobs in Iowa State
government are lower than starting wages in predominantly male jobs.
Pay in mixed jobs is lower than that in predominantly male jobs but
higher than that in predominantly female jobs. Male government jobs
require slightly higher levels of education and prior experience than do
female jobs. The relative market gap in education and experience require-
ments between male and female jobs is larger, based on the Dictionary
of Occupational Titles (U.S. Department of Labor 1977) measures for
these jobs. Male government jobs provide less opportunity for pay growth
and have fewer openings per year than do female jobs. The former is
contrary to the general pattern (Blau 1977, p. 100) and may reflect the
greater number of female-dominated medical occupations (nurses, thera-
pists, etc.) found in state government.
The estimates of equations (9a) – (9c) using the sample of qualified
applicants in Iowa state government are reported in table 7. The results
for predominantly male and female jobs are very consistent with those
obtained from use of the multistate data set on incumbents. Female rela-
tive wage elasticities are greatest for predominantly female jobs and small-
est in predominantly male jobs, as in the sample of incumbents. For mixed
jobs, female supply is less elastic or equally elastic compared to men, in
contrast to the larger female elasticities obtained for mixed jobs in the
sample of incumbents.
The difference in male- and female-wage elasticities are reported in row
5 of table 5. For male-dominated jobs, the estimates are similar to those
in the incumbents sample. Males are much more sensitive than women
to government wages in traditionally male jobs. For traditionally female
jobs, women still have larger wage elasticities relative to men. The gap is
much smaller than in the earlier estimates but is statistically significant.
Men now have more elastic supply to mixed jobs, but the difference is
only marginally significant. In both data sets, the female wage elasticity
increases relative to the male elasticity as the analysis moves from male-
dominated to mixed to female-dominated jobs.
The larger differences in male and female wage elasticities in the incum-
bents sample versus the applicants sample is consistent with the presump-
tion that male and female labor supply decisions are becoming more
similar over time. Since incumbents would be expected to be from older
cohorts on average than are job seekers, one would expect smaller differ-
ences in wage elasticities in the applicants sample.
The Iowa applications sample offers a further check on whether the
proportion of female incumbents by job reflects largely supply-side
decisions. Using the same 148 occupations, we regressed the propor-
tion female among new hires on the proportion female in the applicant
pool using data averaged over the available years. The null hypothesis
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Table 7
Regression Analysis of Female Iowa State Government Application Shares
Equation
(9a) (9b) (9c)
w/100 0.017* 0.024* .002
(1.67) (1.66) (.12)
w∗Female Job .018** .032** .029**
(5.46) (8.70) (8.07)
w∗Male Job 0.020** 0.032** 0.030**
(5.81) (9.66) (8.95)
Union 0.016 0.046** 0.070**
(.76) (1.99) (3.07)
Openings .0104** .0353** .0179**
(2.12) (4.86) (3.80)
Required (Iowa) Education .008 .007 .014*
(1.75) (1.10) (1.91)
Required (Iowa) Experience 0.002 .0005 .002
(.30) (.06) (.26)
Pay Growth .002 0.006** 0.0003
(.61) (1.81) (.07)
Market Variables:
SF .493**
(10.8)
SˆF .198**
(4.24)
W/100 0.029**
(4.89)
WM/WF 0.094
(1.00)
Required Experience 0.001**
(2.30)
Required Reading 0.008
(.41)
Required Mathematics .024
(1.33)
Required Logic .006
(.31)
Required Strength 0.067**
(5.10)
Benefits 0.070**
(2.95)
Intercept .267** .556** .861**
(3.29) (6.16) (6.99)
R2 .68 .57 .61
N 415 415 415
NOTE.— t-statistics corrected for heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
that the share of women among applicants and new hires were equal
could not be rejected at the .10 significance level. This is consistent
with the view that state government did not discriminate in hiring
during this period.
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A few other results are worth noting. Required strength and experience
and benefit levels in the market lower the proportion of women among
incumbents and applicants. Educational skills are not statistically signifi-
cant in the applications data estimates, but the signs are consistent with
the incumbents sample estimates. Relative earnings of men and women
in the overall occupation also did not have a significant effect on the
proportion of women among incumbents or applicants.
C. Simulations
Sorenson (1987) reported that comparable worth wage adjustments
increased relative pay for female jobs by 11%. To show how changes in
relative pay affect the relative number of women in state jobs, we used
the estimates in tables 3, 4, and 7 to predict the proportion female in
government jobs if pay for female jobs relative to other jobs increased
by 11%, holding average wages in state government fixed.10 This was
accomplished by raising wages for predominantly female jobs by 6.4%
and lowering wages for other jobs by 4.2%. While this exercise allows
us to isolate the effects of relative pay on supply, holding fixed the ratio
of overall government to private-sector pay, it also has some basis in
reality. Governmental budget constraints imply that real pay increases
for some jobs may require real pay reductions in others, say by holding
pay increases below the rate of inflation.11
The largest supply response to a comparable worth policy, as shown
in the bottom half of table 5, are in predominantly male jobs. The propor-
tion of female incumbents in male jobs is predicted to increase by 10.1%,
while the proportion of female applicants rises by 9.4%. The reason is
that men leave government more readily when government wages fall
because of the higher male wage elasticity in predominantly male jobs.
Women’s employment share also rises in predominantly female jobs, al-
beit by a much smaller percentage than the increase in male jobs. For
mixed jobs, the simulated responses imply a small reduction in women’s
share of employment but a small increase in their share of applicants.
Overall, this simulated comparable worth policy raised the proportion
of women among incumbents by 3.25% and the proportion of women
applicants to state government by 3.42%.12
10 The simulated proportion female does not require that only supply-side
factors explain the wage elasticities. The simulations will reflect both demand
and supply-side factors if discriminatory tastes affect the wages elasticities in
table 5.
11 See Orazem and Mattila (1990) for a discussion of these issues.
12 These simulated comparable worth effects are partially consistent with the
pattern of female incumbency we observe in the multistate sample. The relative
supply elasticities estimated from the Iowa sample suggest that lowering relative
pay for male and mixed dominated jobs would raise the proportion female in
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Table 8
Unweighted Average Proportion Female
Male Dominated Mixed Job Female Dominated
Comparable worth states .104 .514 .872
Non-factor-point states .082 .582 .922
V. Conclusions
Using two different data sets, we find strong evidence that the pro-
portion of women in state government jobs is affected by relative
occupational pay. In particular, our findings suggest that women have
higher supply elasticities in predominantly female jobs and men have
larger supply elasticities in male jobs. While our findings might be
explained by employment discrimination in favor of women in higher-
paid female jobs and in favor of men in higher-paid male jobs, it is
more likely that these results are attributable to different public-sector
supply elasticities between men and women. The supply-side interpre-
tation is supported by similar findings in a sample of job applicants
and evidence supporting the hypothesis of sex-blind hiring from appli-
cation pools.
The findings suggest that policies that alter relative pay in state
government will alter the gender composition of state jobs. In particu-
lar, comparable worth policies that raise relative pay in traditionally
female jobs while lowering relative pay in traditionally male jobs will
raise the proportion of females in male-dominated and female-domi-
nated jobs and will tend to increase the female share of public-sector
jobs more generally. The implication is that supply-side responses by
themselves need not prevent comparable worth pay adjustments from
raising total female compensation. This conclusion must be qualified
by noting the potentially offsetting decline in female compensation as
women gain an increasing proportion of male-dominated jobs that
suffer falling real wages.
male jobs and lower the proportion female in mixed jobs. The prediction is
consistent with the multistate, cross-sectional pattern of female incumbency as
shown in table 8. However, raising pay in the female-dominated jobs should raise
the proportion female in comparable worth states, in contradiction to the observed
cross-sectional pattern. It should be emphasized that a better test would be to
observe female incumbency longitudinally as relative pay is changed within a
state, but that is not possible with the current data.
/ 9e0e$$ja12 11-12-97 09:42:04 laeca UC: Labor Econ
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.217 on Thu, 27 Oct 2016 17:25:24 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Appendix
Table A1
Seventy-Eight Jobs in the Multistate Sample of Incumbents
Number of States Mean %
Responding Female Job Type
Professional and management related:
Accountant 21 .615 Mixed
Attorney I 14 .365 Mixed
Audiologist 14 .693 Mixed
Auditor I 20 .456 Mixed
Budget Analyst 19 .341 Mixed
Business Manager I 17 .423 Mixed
Chaplain I 19 .086 M-dom
Chemist I 20 .473 Mixed
Dentist 19 .169 M-dom
Dietitian 19 .884 F-dom
Librarian I 21 .730 Mixed
Microbiologist 21 .582 Mixed
Occupational Therapist I 21 .767 F-dom
Personnel Officer 20 .583 Mixed
Pharmacist I 18 .462 Mixed
Physical Therapist I 19 .607 Mixed
Physician 16 .232 M-dom
Probation and Parole Officer 20 .357 Mixed
Psychologist 21 .241 M-dom
Purchasing Agent 20 .528 Mixed
Registered Nurse I 19 .832 F-dom
Safety Officer I 16 .293 Mixed
Social Worker 21 .738 Mixed
Speech Therapist 19 .734 Mixed
Statistical Analyst I 19 .502 Mixed
Tax Auditor 19 .400 Mixed
Veterinarian 18 .070 M-dom
Vocational Rehabilitation Counselor 19 .543 Mixed
Technical:
Airplane Pilot 16 .010 M-dom
Dental Hygienist 19 .873 F-dom
Engineering Technician I 20 .153 M-dom
Laboratory Technician 20 .641 Mixed
Licensed Practical Nurse 21 .893 F-dom
Medical Laboratory Technician 16 .689 Mixed
Programmer 21 .432 Mixed
X-Ray Tech 17 .743 Mixed
Operators and laborers:
Equipment Operator 19 .029 M-dom
Groundskeeper 20 .183 M-dom
Laborer 21 .187 M-dom
Laundry Workers 21 .675 Mixed
Seamstress 16 .868 F-dom
Welder 16 .023 M-dom
Service:
Baker 16 .358 Mixed
Barber 15 .300 Mixed
Beautician 17 .827 F-dom
Cook 21 .605 Mixed
Correctional Officer I 21 .176 M-dom
Custodial Worker 20 .402 Mixed
Dental Assistant 19 .877 F-dom
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Table A1 (Continued )
Number of States Mean %
Responding Female Job Type
Food Service Worker 20 .600 Mixed
Forest Ranger 17 .116 M-dom
Highway Patrol Officer 18 .081 M-dom
Lab Assistant 20 .710 Mixed
Nursing Aid 18 .764 F-dom
Psychologist Assistant 12 .546 Mixed
Security Guard 20 .188 M-dom
Administrative support and sales:
Administrative Assistant 20 .863 F-dom
Cashier 15 .844 F-dom
Clerk 20 .848 F-dom
Clerk Typist 21 .949 F-dom
Computer Operator I 20 .503 Mixed
Data Entry Operator I 21 .896 F-dom
Interviewer 14 .641 Mixed
Library Assistant 21 .770 F-dom
Personnel Assistant 21 .931 F-dom
Postal Clerk 19 .431 Mixed
Receptionist 16 .926 F-dom
Secretary 21 .968 F-dom
Switchboard Operator 18 .944 F-dom
Word Processor Operator 20 .967 F-dom
Craft and repair:
Auto Mechanic 20 .008 M-dom
Carpenter 21 .067 M-dom
Electrician 21 .014 M-dom
Locksmith 19 .036 M-dom
Maintenance Mechanic 20 .023 M-dom
Maintenance Painter 21 .041 M-dom
Mason 13 .088 M-dom
Plumber 20 .012 M-dom
NOTE.—M-dom  male-dominated; F-dom  female-dominated.
References
Beller, Andrea H. ‘‘Occupational Segregation by Sex: Determinants and
Changes.’’ Journal of Human Resources 17 (Summer 1982) : 371–92.
Bergman, Barbara R. ‘‘Does the Market for Women’s Labor Need Fix-
ing?’’ Journal of Economic Perspectives 3 (Winter 1989) : 43–60.
Bielby, William T., and Baron, James N. ‘‘A Woman’s Place Is with Other
Women: Sex Segregation within Organizations.’’ In Sex Segregation in
the Work Place: Trends, Explanations, Remedies, edited by Barbara F.
Reskin, pp. 27–55. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1984.
Blank, Rebecca M. ‘‘An Analysis of Workers’ Choice between Employ-
ment in the Public and Private Sectors.’’ Industrial and Labor Relations
Review 38 (January 1985) : 211–24.
Blau, Francine D. Equal Pay in the Office. Lexington, MA: Lexington
Books, 1977.
England, Paula. ‘‘The Failure of Human Capital Theory to Explain Occu-
pational Sex Segregation.’’ Journal of Human Resources 17 (Summer
1982) : 358–70.
/ 9e0e$$ja12 11-12-97 09:42:04 laeca UC: Labor Econ
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.217 on Thu, 27 Oct 2016 17:25:24 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
120 Orazem/Mattila
Filer, Randall. ‘‘Sexual Differences in Earnings: The Role of Individual
Personalities and Tastes.’’ Journal of Human Resources 18 (Winter
1983) : 87–99.
Freeman, Richard B. ‘‘Supply Elasticities for Educated Labor.’’ In Eco-
nomics of Education: Research and Studies, edited by George Psachara-
polous, pp. 244–48. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1987. (a )
. ‘‘How Do Public Sector Wages and Employment Respond to
Economic Conditions?’’ In Public Sector Payrolls, edited by David A.
Wise, pp. 183–213. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. (b )
Groshen, Erica L. ‘‘The Structure of the Female/Male Wage Differential.’’
Journal of Human Resources 26 (Summer 1991) : 457–72.
Iowa Department of Personnel. ‘‘Minimum Qualifications Guide.’’ Loose
leaf. Des Moines, IA: Merit Employment, 1986.
Kim, Marlene. ‘‘Gender Bias in Compensation Structures: A Case Study
of Its Historical Basis and Persistence.’’ Journal of Social Issues 45
(Winter 1989) : 39–50.
Krueger, Alan B. ‘‘Are Public Sector Workers Paid More than Alternative
Wage? Evidence from Longitudinal Data and Job Queues.’’ In When
Public Sector Workers Unionize, edited by Richard B. Freeman and
Casey Ichniowski, pp. 217–42. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1988.
McDowell, John M. ‘‘Obsolescence of Knowledge and Career Publication
Profiles: Some Evidence of Differences among Fields in Costs of Inter-
rupted Careers.’’ American Economic Review 72 (September 1982) :
752–68.
Orazem, Peter F., and Mattila, J. Peter. ‘‘The Implementation Process of
Comparable Worth: Winners and Losers.’’ Journal of Political Econ-
omy 98 (February 1990) : 134–52.
. ‘‘Human Capital, Uncertain Wage Distributions, and Occupa-
tional and Educational Choices.’’ International Economic Review 32
(February 1991) : 103–22.
Polachek, Solomon W. ‘‘Occupational Self-Selection: A Human Capital
Approach to Sex Differences in Occupational Structure.’’ Review of
Economics and Statistics 58 (February 1981) : 60–69.
Quinn, Joseph F. ‘‘Pension Wealth of Government and Private Sector
Workers.’’ American Economic Review 72 (May 1982): 283–87.
Sandell, Steven H., and Shapiro, David. ‘‘Work Expectations, Human
Capital Accumulation, and the Wages of Young Women.’’ Journal of
Human Resources 15 (Summer 1980) : 335–53.
Smith, Sharon P. Equal Pay in the Public Sector: Facts or Fantasy.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977.
Sorenson, Elaine. ‘‘Effect of Comparable Worth Policies on Earnings.’’
Industrial Relations 26 (Fall 1987) : 227–39.
. ‘‘The Crowding Hypothesis and Comparable Worth.’’ Journal
of Human Resources 25 (Winter 1990) : 55–89.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. ‘‘Employer Costs for Employee Compen-
sation—March.’’ News. Various issues.
. Employment and Earnings, vol. 36 (January 1989) .
/ 9e0e$$ja12 11-12-97 09:42:04 laeca UC: Labor Econ
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.217 on Thu, 27 Oct 2016 17:25:24 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
121Comparable Worth
. 1980 Census of Population: Detailed Population Characteristics.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983.
U.S. Bureau of the Census. Current Population Surveys. Tapes. Washing-
ton, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census, various years.
U.S. Department of Labor. Dictionary of Occupational Titles. 4th ed.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977.
White, Halbert. ‘‘A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix
Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity.’’ Econometrica 48
(May 1980): 817–38.
/ 9e0e$$ja12 11-12-97 09:42:04 laeca UC: Labor Econ
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.217 on Thu, 27 Oct 2016 17:25:24 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
